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This study offers an overview of shareholder activism in Brazil through the mapping of 
various types and examples of activism, the construction of an activism index and an 
analysis relating the activism index to corporate characteristics. The sample contains 195 
companies listed on the Brazilian stock exchange and observed in 2008, 2010 and 2012. 
The data sources are the minutes of ordinary and extraordinary shareholder meetings, 
complaints filed with the securities commission and news articles published in a daily 
business newspaper. The study documents the increase in the average activism index 
during the period, with only eight companies failing to register any type of activism event. 
However, the items comprising the index did not develop in a homogeneous fashion, with 
some remaining stable while others decline. The indicators with the highest rates of growth 
during the period were: minority presentation of proposals at shareholder meetings; 
cumulative voting requests to elect directors; and the number of news articles related to 
the topic. Non-inferential analyses document that evidence of activism is more often found 
in: larger companies; those with many shareholders; with inferior corporate governance 
practices; and controlled by the state.  




Esta pesquisa oferece um panorama do ativismo dos acionistas no Brasil, envolvendo o 
mapeamento das diversas evidências de ativismo, a construção de um índice de ativismo 
e uma análise preliminar relacionando o índice de ativismo com características 
corporativas. A amostra contém 195 empresas listadas na BM&FBovespa e observadas 
nos anos de 2008, 2010 e 2012. As fontes dos dados são as atas de assembleias 
ordinárias e extraordinárias, os processos abertos junto à CVM e as notícias veiculadas na 
mídia especializada. Documenta-se o crescimento do índice de ativismo médio no 
período amostral e apenas 8 empresas não registraram nenhum evento de ativismo. 
Entretanto, os itens que compõem o índice não evoluem homogeneamente, registrando-
se estabilidade ou decréscimo em alguns casos. Os indicadores com maior taxa de 
crescimento no período são: apresentação de propostas em assembleias por minoritários; 
solicitação de voto múltiplo; e o número de notícias na imprensa relacionadas ao tema. 
Análises preliminares de caráter não-inferencial documentam que evidências de ativismo 
são mais frequentes em: empresas de maior porte; com muitos acionistas; com práticas 
de governança corporativa inferiores; e de controle estatal. 
Palavras-chave: ativismo, governança corporativa, investidores institucionais 
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1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
Shareholdings of institutional investors are an external control mechanism that is 
becoming increasingly important and may affect the corporate governance practices of a 
company (AGGARWAL et al., 2011). This article offers a descriptive documental analysis 
of activist actions in Brazil in 2008, 2010 and 2012. The document analysis comprises 
more than 5000 proposals included in the minutes of shareholder meetings, accounts 
published in the Valor Econômico business daily, in addition to cases filed with the 
Securities Commission of Brazil (CVM or Comissão de Valores Mobiliários). The article 
also proposes and develops scoring criteria for an activism index attributed to each 
company according to various shareholder demands. Finally, the article presents some 
basic and descriptive correlations, without attempting any type of causal inference.  
As far as could be ascertained, the documental survey of thousands of items 
relating to activism about Brazil is unprecedented, and, possibly, in emerging markets. The 
Brazilian literature on the impact of the presence of institutional investors on the value of 
companies and the quality of their corporate governance (CG) practices is inconclusive 
(OLIVEIRA, LEAL, and ALMEIDA, 2012; PUNSUVO, KAYO, and BARROS, 2007). The 
metrics used by Brazilian authors include binary categorical variables to indicate the 
presence of certain types of institutional investors or specific institutions and their stakes in 
companies. The quantitative results stemming from this literature strongly suggest that 
institutional investors cannot be treated as a uniform category and that a given institutional 
investor may act in favor of or against the interests of minority shareholders or its 
beneficiaries, depending on its links with the controlling shareholders of the companies it 
invests in. Thus, it is essential to gain a greater understanding of activism actions in Brazil 
in order to better evaluate routes of investigation for studies that use quantitative models.  
Results show an increase in activism actions in the three sample years. The average 
activism index recorded a 12% growth between 2008 and 2010. In particular, an analysis 
of the minutes of shareholder meetings reveals a substantial increase in requests for the 
adoption of cumulative voting procedures for the election of board members (6 in 2008 
and 12 in 2012) and the actual use of cumulative voting in elections of board members (5 
in 2008 and 22 in 2012). There was also a reduction in the proportion of proposals 
approved unanimously at shareholders’ meetings (64% in 2008 and 51% in 2012) and an 
increase in the number of proposals suggested by minority shareholders in advance of 
shareholder meetings (1 in 2008 and 5 in 2012). It is important to highlight that only 
board members may include items in the agenda of shareholder meetings. The noticeable 
increase in the number of news items related to the topic in the Valor Econômico 
5 
newspaper (7 news stories in 2008, 67 in 2010, and 159 in 2012) suggests an increase 
in activism actions during the period or, at least, in the interest of the specialized media. 
The number of companies that did not register signs of activism during the year fell from 
41 in 2008 to 23 in 2012, while the number of companies with 3 or more events during 
the year rose from 46 in 2008 to 55 in 2012, both out of 195 companies in the sample.  
Despite the increase in the average activism index, several of its components, such 
as the rate of rejection of proposals put forward at shareholder meetings, the number of 
requests to institute fiscal boards and the number of complaints filed with CVM, remained 
stable or declined. In addition, it is important to highlight that, in absolute terms, activism 
indicators remained modest throughout the period. For example, despite having increased 
markedly during the period, the number of proposals suggested by minority shareholders 
in advance of shareholder meetings represented only 0.3% of the total proposals in 2012. 
The average activism index was 1.87 out of a maximum potential level of 11 in that year.  
Activism actions are less frequent among companies listed in the Novo Mercado 
special listing segment of the Brazilian stock exchange (BM&FBovespa) and also among 
those that have a higher CG practices score (measured by a broad index of CG practices). 
This finding is consistent with the arguments in Gillan and Starks (2007) and Chung and 
Zhang (2011) who claim that there may be a substitution relationship between CG 
mechanisms and incentives for shareholder activism. Activism is also greater in large 
companies and those with many shareholders. However, there is no clear relationship 
between the level of the activism index and measures of performance and debt.  
 
2 – LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Large institutional investors can reveal information that is important for the market 
as a whole and influence the management of companies in various ways. Elyasiani and Jia 
(2010) classify the monitoring actions of institutional investors in terms of the stance they 
adopt towards those who command companies as active, passive or conniving. They hold 
that these three approaches are not mutually exclusive. Aggarwal et al. (2011) believe that 
the influence institutional investors on corporate governance practices can be direct or 
indirect. They refer to the direct form as voice, which is achieved through votes or by 
influencing management. They may, for example, sit on boards of directors, giving their 
opinions or making suggestions in private or even through the media when management 
does not accept them. Becht, Bolton, and Röell (2003) remind us that the effectiveness of 
having a seat on the board of directors is limited by domestic laws and regulations, as in 
the case of the Florange Law in France, which grants double voting rights to shareholders 
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who have held their positions for two years or more. Alternatively, the indirect form, voting 
with their feet or the Wall Street walk, manifests itself in the decisions of institutional 
investors to buy or sell shares.  
Becht et al. (2003) claim that liquidity may condition the actions of institutional 
investors due to the size of their shareholdings. Gillan and Starks (2003) observe that 
institutional investors have historically favored liquid companies because their willingness 
to monitor management may be associated with less liquid positions. A lack of liquidity 
and its costs, however, may be unacceptable to many institutional investors. Chung and 
Zhang (2011) conclude that institutional investors prefer companies that display better CG 
practices because they may require less monitoring, are more liquid and less questionable 
from a fiduciary point of view. This conclusion suggests that these investors are attracted to 
companies that adopt best practices, but does not mean that significant institutional 
investor stakes cannot help improve these practices. Bushee et al. (2014) examine the 
behavior of institutional investors who are sensitive to CG practices, in particular whether 
these institutions choose companies which already had good practices or whether they 
take steps to improve them, and they conclude that both situations can occur.  
Gillan and Starks (2003) believe that the presence of institutional investors may 
lead to less noisy share prices and lower monitoring costs for other investors. However, it is 
very difficult to gauge the effectiveness of institutional investors monitoring and separate its 
effects from other influences, such as changes in the economy, markets or management, 
whose observation and measurement are fraught with difficulties. In addition, the possible 
collusion of institutional investors with company management has perhaps led to 
ambiguous results in terms of the impact of their actions (BECHT et al., 2003). Gillan and 
Starks (2003) doubt the effectiveness of institutional investors monitoring because they may 
not have the expertise necessary to advise management. These authors also comment that 
institutional investors have their own agency conflict problems, thus making them imperfect 
monitors.  
Indeed, the impact of institutional investor actions may be difficult to assess. Seifert, 
Gonenc, and Wright (2005), for example, failed to find conclusive evidence of their 
influence on companies in Germany, the US, Japan and the United Kingdom. Becht et al. 
(2003) report that there is little evidence that the presence of institutional investors is 
related to improvements in the operational performance of companies. Hartzell, Sun, and 
Titman (2014), however, affirm that diversified real-estate investment funds in the US 
traded at a higher discount than those concentrating in a specific geographical region. 
However, this effect is attenuated by the presence of institutional investor unit holders, 
particularly those that tend to be activists. These articles suggest that institutional investors 
should not be seen as a monolithic group, without controlling for their characteristics or 
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nature, which, themselves have various dimensions, as pointed out by Goranova and Ryan 
(2014).  
Brazilian studies, so far, do not clearly verify a relationship between the presence of 
institutional investors and company CG, value or performance. Silveira and Barros (2008) 
analyze the determinants of CG practices measured by an index they developed in 2002. 
Their explanatory variables include the significant participation of pension funds in the 
shared control group. Their results for this categorical variable are not significant and do 
not suggest that CG practices are better when pension funds participate in the control 
group. Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2007) affirm that there is no impact on firm value 
when institutional investors are the ultimate controlling shareholders (i.e. after considering 
indirect control structures). Punsuvo et al. (2007) and Oliveira et al. (2012) find a negative 
or neutral relationship, respectively, between the presence of pension funds as relevant 
shareholders and the quality of CG practices. None of these studies address activism but 
solely institutional shareholding.   
It is important to characterize the alignment of institutional investors with the control 
block, as results in Carvalhal (2012) suggests. For example, state company pension funds 
may align with the controlling shareholder when the latter is the state, to the detriment of 
minority shareholders. Crisóstomo and González (2006) report that pension funds began 
to play a more important role as shareholders during the privatization process initiated in 
the 1990s. In addition, the authors affirm that Brazilian pension funds began to adopt 
practices that encouraged activism, such as participation in shareholder meetings, 
exercising voting rights and a closer supervision of company management. These authors, 
however, did not observe differences between the performance of companies where 
pension funds were large shareholders and those where they were not. One could expect 
something similar in the case of the giant Brazilian National Economic and Social 
Development Bank (BNDES) and its equity investment affiliate BNDESPar (INQUE, 
LAZZARINI, and MUSACCHIO, 2013).  
Carvalhal and Souza (2014) investigate the relation between the shareholdings of 
PEVC funds and the CG practices of companies. The authors found a correlation between 
the presence of PEVC funds – independently of the variable used to evaluate this presence 
– and the Corporate Governance Practices Index (IPGC), whose details and format are 
described in Leal, Carvalhal and Iervolino (2015), as well as listing the Novo Mercado. 
The results for the issuance of American Depository Receipts (ADR) are weaker, but still 
show a positive relationship, but the authors do not discuss possible identification issues.  
A conclusion one can draw from these studies is that it is important to assess the 
nature of the involvement of institutional investors and their alignment with the control 
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block, even if they are not signatories of a shareholder agreement. It is highly possible that 
the negative or neutral relationship between the presence of pension funds as important 
shareholders and the quality of CG practices in Punsuvo et al. (2007) and Oliveira et al. 
(2012) is a reflection of a political aspect, which is an important factor in the case of some 
of the most important institutional investors in Brazil.  
 
3 – METHODOLOGY 
 
The population for this study is the companies whose shares trade on the Brazilian 
Securities, Commodities and Futures Exchange (BM&FBovespa). Two criteria were 
observed to select the sample: (1) the company had to trade in the three sample years 
(2008, 2010 and 2012) and (2) there had to be minimum market liquidity. Thus, the 
same 195 companies were observed during each year. This criterion introduces a 
survivorship and size bias in the selection of the sample, but increases the chances of 
finding evidence of changes in activism actions. Stock market liquidity is expressed as 









 where   is the number of stock market trading days;   is the 
number of days on which the shares were traded;   is the total number of stock market 
trades;   is the number of trades involving the company’s shares;   is the total monetary 
amount traded in the stock market and   is the monetary amount of trading involving the 
company’s shares. The Liquidity Index had to be greater than 0.001, which means that the 
liquidity of the company approximately corresponds to one thousandth of the market.    
Implementation of CVM rules permitting a greater disclosure and standardization of 
information (CVM Instruction nº 480, 12/07/2009 which instituted the Reference Form as 
a new filing instrument) and requirements for the holding of shareholder meetings (CVM 
Instruction nº 481 of 12/17/2009, which established rules for proxy voting requests and 
advance disclosure of information) begin in 2010. The period selected for this study 
encompassed the year before these changes were made and two subsequent ones.  
 
3.1  Sources of information about shareholder activism  
3.1.1  Meeting minutes 
The call notices and the minutes of the first ordinary shareholder meeting of each 
year and extraordinary shareholders’ meetings were obtained from the CVM’s website. The 
first ordinary shareholders’ meeting of the year has important themes defined in the 
legislation, such as the allocation of net income, auditing of management accounts, 
executive compensation and approval of financial statements.  
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Thirty-three items were searched in each document analyzed to map the 
information. These items involved matters such as shareholder meeting quorums, 
proposals and their authors, protest votes and shareholder opinions recorded in the 
minutes and their authors, requests for the institution of a fiscal board and the adoption of 
cumulative voting. These issues offer a description of what was officially reported from 
these meetings and made it possible to construct the activism index used in the article. The 
study analyzed 1,284 meetings of shareholders, including ordinary and extraordinary 
ones, together with their call documents and minutes.  
 
3.1.2   Complaints filed with CVM 
A request for information about investor consultation or complaints was made 
through the Citizen’s Service Bureau of CVM. It replied with a spreadsheet with data for 
the 2006-2012 period. The complainant provided the information about the nature of the 
complaint when filing it. Only those with the title “Investor Complaint/General Public” 
were considered and cases in which the complainant could not be clearly identified as an 
investor were not used. The procedures described above led to the analysis of 400 cases 
during the three years observed in the study.  
 
3.1.3  News in the Valor Econômico newspaper 
The online version of the Valor Econômico newspaper was surveyed in the January 
1
st
 – December 31
st
 period of each year in the study. These news stories were collected 
using 10 keywords: activism, shareholder activism, minority shareholder, public proxy 
solicitation, shareholder proposal, minority shareholder proposal, agenda proposal, 
proposal in advance of the shareholder meeting and cumulative voting. The news stories 
selected were analyzed to identify the companies in the sample. Cases of recurring news 
stories, in which the same news story was included in more than one article on the same 
day or on different days, were quantified separately. It was also possible to analyze more 
than one case of activism in the same news story, even involving different target 
companies. This procedure led to the analysis of 1,726 news stories, and 233 were 
identified as activism events related to the companies in the sample.  
 
3.2  Shareholder activism index  
In the academic literature one may observe the use of indices composed of binary 
questions in order to provide an approximate measure of the events under investigation. 
This methodological approach can be found in the CG studies involving emerging markets 
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and Brazil, such as Klapper and Love (2004), Silva and Leal (2005), Silveira and Barros 
(2008), and Leal et al. (2015), among others.  
The definition of the questions for inclusion in the index was based on an analysis of 
the documents described in item 3.1 for an initial set of companies. This analysis 
generated a list of 33 items to be observed, which, as described below, were grouped 
together for presentation reasons. Among the items that are not directly reflected in the 
index, but which make it possible to perform descriptive analyses of the activism 
phenomenon, one may cite, for example, the identification of proposals and their authors, 
the number of proposals, shareholder meeting quorums and the subjects covered in news 
stories published in Valor Econômico. The index is composed of 11 binary and objective 
affirmations. The affirmations are grounded in the rights of shareholders established by 
Law 6.404/76 such as, for example, requests for the establishment of a fiscal board, 
adoption of cumulative voting and requests for representation on the board of directors. A 
value of 1 is attributed to each one if it is true and zero otherwise. Thus, the score of each 
company can vary from 0 to 11 in each year. Affirmations 1 to 9 were observed in the 
documents related to ordinary and extraordinary shareholder meetings, affirmation 10 
indicates the existence or not of a complaint against the company filed with CVM and 
affirmation 11 if an activism event was reported in the Valor Econômico newspaper. Table 
1 shows the 11 affirmations.  
 
Table 1 – Activism index  
No. Shareholder activism index questions 
1 Shareholders seek representation on the board of directors and/or the fiscal board  
2 Shareholders reject proposal(s) presented for voting at the shareholders’ meeting 
3 Shareholders vote against, but are not able to reject proposal(s) presented for voting at the 
shareholders’ meeting  
4 Shareholders present proposal(s) in advance to be voted at the shareholders’ meeting  
5 Shareholders present proposal(s) for voting during the shareholders’ meeting  
6 Shareholders request the institution of a fiscal board  
7 Shareholders request the adoption of a cumulative voting process for the election of the board of 
directors  
8 Shareholders suggest and approve a proposal that differs from the one presented by 
management  
9 Shareholders record their opinions in the minutes  
10 Shareholders file a complaint against the company with CVM  




3.3  Variables of interest 
The behavior of the activism index was observed in relation to some variables of 
interest, mainly involving CG, ownership structure and financial characteristics. The aim 
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was to identify future lines of investigation regarding explanatory factors of activism using 
quantitative approaches. The quality of CG practices is assessed in three ways: (1) using a 
binary categorical variable which identifies a listing in the Novo Mercado special segment 
of BM&FBovespa; (2) using a broad index of CG practices developed by Leal and 
Carvalhal (2007), whose current form, used in this study, is described in Leal et al. (2015) 
and (3) using a binary categorical variable that identifies whether the company has 
complied with CVM Instruction 480 regarding the disclosure of management’s minimum 
and maximum compensation levels (BARROS et al., 2015). The present study observed the 
ownership structure in three different ways: (1) type of control, classified as shared (control 
bloc under an agreement), state, family or dispersed; (2) number of individual investors 
and (3) number of institutional investors. Company size is measured by the natural 
logarithm of total assets of the company. Performance is measured through the return on 
equity (ROE), which is the net profit over total equity ratio, and the return on assets (ROA), 
which is measured by dividing operating profits by total assets. Finally, leverage is 
measured by dividing total liabilities by total assets.  
 
4 – RESULTS 
 
4.1  Minutes of ordinary and extraordinary shareholder meetings 
The analysis included call documents and minutes of 1,284 meetings of 
shareholders in the three sampled years. A general observation is that the minutes provide 
few details. Important information is often omitted, such as approval percentages and 
authors of a specific proposal or the identity of shareholders who voted against a 
proposal, as well as detailed quorum information. Table 2 shows the main items of 
information obtained from the minutes before the calculation of the index. A count of the 
proposals on the agenda (item 1) revealed a high number, even though only a small 
number of proposals were presented during the shareholder meeting (items 2 and 3). This 
is not surprising because only the board of directors sets the agenda. However, the 
number of proposals presented in advance by minority shareholders (item 9) was even 
smaller, with only one occurrence in 2008 and 2010, and 5 in 2012.  
In what regards the approval or rejection of proposals, item 5 shows that, albeit 
high, the proportion of proposals approved unanimously declined (64% in 2008, 54% in 
2010, and 51% in 2012). However, more than 90% of the proposals presented at 
shareholder meetings were approved, if the previous percentages are added to the 
approximately 35% of proposals approved by a majority (item 6). The number of rejected 
proposals was thus very small (item 8). These data appear to show that shareholder 
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meetings rarely contest what is proposed by the board, or company management, 
suggesting an environment of mere rubber-stamp approval.  
Items 11 and 15 analyze two mechanisms established in Law 6.404/1976 that 
increase the rights of shareholders: the fiscal board and cumulative voting. The fiscal 
board can be permanent or temporary, and is an optional board. This board does not 
participate in the decision making process, thus it is not an "ex-ante" or "insider" board, as 
the board of directors. It verifies publicized information, such as financial statements, and 
company procedures, somewhat like an audit committee. Minority and non-voting 
shareholder representation in the fiscal board may be easier than in the board of directors. 
Article 141 of Law 6.404/76 states that shareholders holding at least one tenth of the 
voting equity capital may request the adoption of the cumulative voting process, which 
assigns the same number of votes as the number of board of directors members to each 
share and concedes the right to concentrate them in one board of directors candidate or 
distribute them as the shareholder wishes. This increases the chances of minority 
representation in the board of directors. In the case of these initiatives, the target 
companies and authors of the proposals were surveyed, but it was not always possible to 
identify proponents clearly.  
The proponents of requests to institute a fiscal board that appeared more than 
once during the period (and the number of occurrences) were: an undetermined number 
of minority shareholders (20); Previ, the Banco do Brazil employees pension fund, the 
largest in the country (7); one minority shareholder (4); holders of preferred shares, almost 
always non-voting (4); Orbe Value master stock fund, a mutual fund (3); and Victor Adler, 
an individual (3). It was not possible to identify whether the shareholders nominated in the 
minutes were minority shareholders. The most frequently targeted companies, with 3 
requests during the period, were: Aço Altona, Fras-Le, GPC Participações, Randon 




Table 2 - Analysis of the contents of the minutes of shareholder meetings 
 2008 2010 2012 
1 – Proposals placed on the agenda 1902 1809 1705 
2 – Proposals suggested at the shareholders’ meeting by minority 
shareholders  22 24 22 
3 – Proposals suggested at the shareholders’ meeting by the controlling 
shareholder or by someone who was not identified as a minority 
shareholder  21 17 22 
4 – Proposals that were on the agenda but were not voted on  34 57 77 
5 – Proposals approved unanimously 1213 980 877 
6 – Proposals approved by a majority of shareholders  610 747 669 
7 – Proposals approved with no record if unanimously or by a majority 83 63 123 
8 – Proposals that were not approved 5 3 3 
9 – Proposals suggested in advance by minority shareholders (number)  1 1 5 
10 – Approved proposals suggested in advance by minority 
shareholders 1 1 1 
11 – Minority shareholders request to institute a fiscal board during the 
shareholders’ meeting 19 21 17 
12 – Approved minority shareholders request to institute a fiscal board 
during the shareholders’ meeting  20 21 15 
13 – Minority shareholders elect fiscal board members (actually elected 
– number) 92 108 114 
14 – Minority shareholders elect members of the board of directors 
(effective – number) 69 77 74 
15 – Shareholders request the adoption of a cumulative voting process 
for the election of the board of directors  6 7 16 
16 – Cumulative voting process is used to elect members of the board 
of directors  5 7 22 
17 – Protest vote formalized at the shareholders’ meeting by a 
shareholder who is not the controlling one  0 0 0 
18 – Opinion presented  8 4 5 
 
Although not frequent, requests to adopt cumulative voting increased substantially 
in the period. The proponents who appeared more than once during the period observed 
(and the number of occurrences) were: an undetermined number of minority shareholders 
(4); Previ (4); Southern Electric Brasil Participações Ltda. (3); AGC Energia S.A. (2); and 
Victor Adler (2). The most frequently targeted companies were Cemig (5), Celesc (4) and 
Unipar (2). The first two are energy companies, mostly electricity, and the third one is a 
petrochemical company. An analysis of the two mechanisms showed that Previ, the 
pension fund, and Victor Adler, an individual shareholder, were particularly active.  
 
4.2  News stories in the Valor Econômico newspaper and cases filed with CVM 
Keyword research in the website Valor Econômico newspaper generated a set of 
1,713 news stories. The activism theme was identified in 233 of them and became more 
common during the period: 7 news stories in 2008, 67 in 2010 and 159 in 2012. The 
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activism-related themes were very diverse and 48 different subjects were mapped. 
Shareholder agreements, changes in bylaws, lawsuits and indemnity, were quite rare (one 
occurrence each). The most frequent themes and their number were: public offer to buy 
(43); representation on the board of directors (29); mergers (27); corporate reorganization 
(14); dissenting vote of minority shareholders at the shareholders’ meeting  (10); share 
dilution (8); distribution of dividends (6); changes in bylaws (5); equity capital increase (5). 
The ten companies that appeared the most in the news stories observed (and frequency) 
were: Brasil Telecom (27); Eletrobras (25); Redecard (24); Petrobras (17); Oi (15); Gafisa 
(13); Celesc (11); Pão de Açúcar - CBD - Grupo Pão de Açúcar (10); Laep (9); Confab 
(8).  
As regards the complaints informed by CVM in which the topic was “Investor 
Complaint/General Public”, there was a decline in their frequency during the period with 
162 cases registered in 2008, 132 in 2010, and 106 in 2012. In the “Description of the 
topic” box of the database provided by CVM, the most frequent themes were: measures 
adopted by the controlling shareholder and/or CEO of the company; shareholdings 
(reverse split, split, stock dividends); material information disclosure and quarterly financial 
statements.  Sixty companies were targets of more than one CVM complaint during the 
period. The ten companies with the highest number of complaints were: Banco do Brasil 
(65), Bradesco (38), Petrobras (20), Laep (19), Telemar (18), Telebras (17), Agrenco (13), 
Itau Unibanco (12), BM&FBovespa (9), Eletrobras (7). 
 
4.3  Activism index 
Table 3 presents the activism index for the 195 companies in the sample. Each 
affirmation portrayed in Table 1 is assessed in each year with value one if that type of 
activism is present and zero if it is not. Thus, the index can vary from 0 to 11. The average 
values observed, although very low, registered an increase of 12% between 2008 and 
2012 (with no change between 2010 and 2012). The activism-related actions that 
increased the most during the period were requests for representation on the board of 
directors (affirmation 1), votes against proposals (affirmation 3), request for the adoption 
of cumulative voting (affirmation 7) and news stories published in the Valor Econômico 
newspaper (affirmation 11). Despite the increase in the percentage of companies with 
dissident votes (affirmation 3), the rejection of proposals did not occur very often and 
declined during the period (affirmation 2).  
Observing the average rate of growth during the three years, the greatest 
proportional increase was registered by the presentation of proposals at shareholder 
meetings (affirmation 4), followed by requests for the adoption of cumulative voting 
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(affirmation 7) and the number of news stories in Valor Econômico. The following declined 
during the period: requests to record opinions in the minutes, request for the institution of 
a fiscal board, complaints filed with CVM and the presentation of proposals at shareholder 
meetings. Even though the activism index was constructed with a maximum value of 11, the 
maximum value observed in the sample was 6. Only 8 companies had no type of activism 
event in any of the three years (CR2, Daycoval, Docas de Imbituba, Eucatex, GP Invest, 
Sansuy, Springer, and Wilson Sons). Seventy-three percent of the companies had more 
than one activism event during the period.  
Table 4 shows the frequency distribution of the scores in the three years in the 
sample. The number of companies with no activism event mapped by the index fell 
substantially during the period (from 41 in 2008 to 23 in 2012). On the other hand, the 
number of companies with 3 or more events rose from 46 in 2008 to 55 in 2012. The 
data appear to show that, although not very frequent, the level of activism increased during 
the period. The still rare occurrence of activism events seems consistent with the lack of 
effectiveness of institutional investors in Brazil highlighted in Punsuvo et al. (2007) and 
Oliveira et al. (2012). This finding is also in line with Dutra and Saito (2002) who had 
already revealed the scarce use of cumulative voting in the country.  
 
Table 3 – Activism index – Change during the period 
 
2008 2010 2012 
Activism Index Average 1.66 1.86 1.87 
Shareholder Activism Index Question Averages:  
(1) Shareholders seek representation on the board of 
directors and/or the fiscal board  0.385 0.456 0.482 
(2) Shareholders reject proposal(s) presented for voting at the 
shareholders’ meeting 0.021 0.015 0.015 
(3) Shareholders vote against, but are not able to reject 
proposal(s) presented for voting at the shareholders’ meeting  0.707 0.774 0.744 
(4) Shareholders present proposal(s) in advance to be voted 
at the shareholders’ meeting  0.005 0.005 0.015 
(5) Shareholders present proposal(s) for voting during the 
shareholders’ meeting  0.108 0.123 0.103 
(6) Shareholders request the institution of a fiscal board  
0.097 0.108 0.082 
(7) Shareholders request the adoption of a cumulative voting 
process for the election of the board of directors  0.021 0.036 0.077 
(8) Shareholders suggest and approve a proposal that differs 
from the one presented by management  0.000 0.000 0.000 
(9) Shareholders record their opinions in the minutes  
0.031 0.021 0.021 
(10) Shareholders file a complaint against the company with 
CVM  0.251 0.267 0.231 
(11) News stories about the company report some kind of 





Table 4 – Activism index – Frequency distribution 
Activism 
index 
2008 2010 2012 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
0 41 21.03 24 12.31 23 11.79 
1 60 30.77 63 32.31 66 33.85 
2 48 24.62 57 29.23 51 26.15 
3 26 13.33 28 14.36 32 16.41 
4 13 6.67 14 7.18 16 8.21 
5 4 2.05 8 4.10 5 2.56 
6 3 1.54 1 0.51 2 1.03 
Total 195 100 195 100 195 100 
 
 
4.4  Activism index and variables of interest   
Table 5 presents the average values of the activism index according to CG and 
ownership identity variables. Panels A and D exhibit the three broad metrics used to assess 
CG practices. Companies listed in the Novo Mercado had an average activism index 
score of 1.61, compared with 2.12 in the case of other companies, i.e. there was less 
activism among Novo Mercado companies. The averages are higher in the third and 
fourth quartiles (2.02 and 1.97) of the CG Practices Index, the companies with the worst 
CG practices. The two results suggest the existence of a potential substitution relationship 
between CG practices and activism. Gillan and Starks (2007) suggest that the poor quality 
of CG practices provides a motivation for activism. Curiously, there was no clear 
association between non-compliance with disclosure of executive compensation details 
(Panel B) and activism. Companies that did not disclose this information showed less 
evidence of activism (average = 1.69), possibly because among those using the 
preliminary court injunction allowing non-compliance are some of the largest and best 
performing companies in Brazil, consistently with Barros et al. (2015).  
 
Table 5 – Average activism index values according to corporate governance characteristics 
Panel A: Listing segment Panel B: Compliance with disclosure of compensation 
regulation 
NM Non-NM Compliance No compliance 
1.61 2.12 1.83 1.69 
    
Panel C: Type of controlling 
shareholder 
Panel D: CGPI and number of individual and institutional 
shareholders 







 (upper) 1.58 1.86 1.80 
Foreign 2.36 2
nd 
1.59 1.89 1.95 
Family 1.68 3
rd 
2.02 1.70 1.82 
Dispersed 1.85 4
th
 (lower) 1.97 1.63 1.62 
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Table 6 – Average activism undex values according to selected control variables 
Quartile Size ROE ROA Leverage 
1º. (upper) 2.19 1.86 1.65 1.66 
2º. 1.79 1.74 1.90 1.98 
3º. 1.68 1.82 1.79 1.85 
4º. (lower) 1.53 1.78 1.94 1.71 
 
The variables related to ownership identity are presented in panels C and D. The 
type of control seems to be associated with differences in the average values of the 
activism index. Activism appeared to be more common amid state-owned, foreign 
controlled and dispersed ownership companies, and less frequent in companies with 
shared or family control. The number of individual or institutional investors may affect the 
degree of activism as well. It tends to be greater in companies when there are more 
individual and institutional shareholders. This evidence appears to contradict Strickland, 
Wiles and Zenner’s (1996) suggestion that activism is lower when there are many small 
shareholders, given their lack of motivation for engaging in activist initiatives. However, as 
observed by Dutra and Saito (2002), this can be explained in the case of Brazil by the high 
degree of control rights concentration, which, in many cases, prevents minority 
shareholders from jointly attaining the minimum percentage necessary to request the 
adoption of cumulative voting.   
Some of the financial variables that are usually analyzed in studies of activism, and 
described in the methodology, are presented in Table 6. Average activism index values 
were calculated for the companies according to their quartile distribution. There seems to 
be an association between firm size and activism, with larger firms exhibiting higher 
activism index values. This result is in line with the findings of studies by Smith (1996), 
Strickland et al. (1996) and Jong, Mertens, and Roosenboom (2006). However, the 
association between performance and the activism index was not clear. The lowest 
performance quartiles of ROE were not the ones with the highest average activism index 
values. On the other hand, the behavior of ROA was somewhat consistent with 
expectations that poor performance motivates activism because its lower performance 
quartile exhibited the highest average activism index score (STRICKLANK et al., 1996; 
POULSEN, STRAND, and THOMSEN, 2010). There appeared to be no relationship 
between leverage and the activism index. The upper and lower leverage quartiles exhibited 
the lowest levels of the activism index, while the second and third quartiles had the highest 




5 – CONCLUSIONS 
 
The documents consulted, especially the minutes of shareholders’ meetings, 
contain insufficient details of the activities in the meeting. Even so, their analysis offers an 
overview of shareholder activism in Brazil and its recent evolution. There is evidence that 
activism is increasing. For example, there was: (1) substantial increase in requests to adopt 
cumulative voting for the election of directors (6 to 16 between 2008 and 2012); (2) 
reduction in the proportion of proposals approved unanimously (64% in 2008, 54% in 
2010, and 51% in 2012); (3) increase in the number of proposals suggested in advance 
by minority shareholders (1 to 5 between 2008 and 2012); (4) substantial increase in 
news articles related to the theme (7 in 2008, 67 in 2010 and 159 in 2012); (5) reduction 
in the number of companies without an activism event during the year (41 in 2008, 23 in 
2012) and (6) an increase in the number of companies with three or more events during 
the year (46 in 2008, 55 in 2012). This pattern was reflected in the 12% increase in the 
average activism index score between 2008 and 2010 (with the rate of growth close to 
zero between 2010 and 2012). However, it should be recognized that the absolute value 
of the average activism index, as well as most of its components, remained low throughout 
the period. For example, the number of proposals suggested in advance of shareholder 
meetings by minority shareholders represented a mere 0.3% of total proposals placed on 
the agenda in 2012. In addition, various activism indicators remained stable or declined 
during the period. For example, less than 10% of proposals (usually presented by 
company management) were rejected during any of the years and the rejection rate fell 
during the period; the number of requests to institute a fiscal board also fell during the 
period; the number of complaints filed with CVM fell from 162 in 2008 to 106 in 2012. 
This type of data suggest that shareholder activism in Brazil may have gained greater 
visibility during the period analyzed but remains rather limited.  
Evidence of activism is clearly more often found amid large firms, in line with what 
is reported in the international literature. The average activism index is also higher in 
companies with inferior CG practices. This evidence suggests the existence of a 
substitution relationship between CG mechanisms and incentives for shareholder activism, 
in line with the arguments found in Gillan and Starks (2007) and Chung and Zhang 
(2011). On the other hand, in contrast with Strickland et al. (1996), the activism index 
tends to be higher in companies with a larger number of shareholders. Naturally, these 
analyses do not have any inferential and causal ambitions and their purpose is to identify 
avenues for future research, which could model activism determinants and impacts, after 
the proposals of Goranova and Ryan (2014) and Judge, Gaur and Muller-Kahle (2010), 
for example, as well as revisit the calculation of the activism index herein. Finally, activism 
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cases could be investigated in qualitative analyses to shed light on the nature of activism in 
Brazil.   
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